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The noisy-storage model allows the implementation of secure two-party protocols under the sole
assumption that no large-scale reliable quantum storage is available to the cheating party. No
quantum storage is thereby required for the honest parties. Examples of such protocols include
bit commitment, oblivious transfer and secure identification. Here, we provide a guideline for the
practical implementation of such protocols. In particular, we analyze security in a practical setting
where the honest parties themselves are unable to perform perfect operations and need to deal with
practical problems such as errors during transmission and detector inefficiencies. We provide explicit
security parameters for two different experimental setups using weak coherent, and parametric down
conversion sources. In addition, we analyze a modification of the protocols based on decoy states.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography allows us to solve cryptographic tasks without resorting to unproven computational as-
sumptions. One example is quantum key distribution (QKD) which is well-studied within quantum information [1, 2].
In QKD, the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) trust each other, but want to shield their communication from the
prying eyes of an eavesdropper. In many other cryptographic problems, however, Alice and Bob themselves do not
trust each other, but nevertheless want to cooperate to solve a certain task. An important example of such a task is
secure identification. Here, Alice wants to identify herself to Bob (possibly an ATM machine) without revealing her
password. More generally, Alice and Bob wish to perform secure function evaluation as depicted in Figure 1.
FIG. 1: Alice holds an input x (e.g. her password), and Bob holds an input y (e.g. the password an honest Alice should possess),
and they want to obtain the value of some function f(x, y) (e.g. the equality function).
In this scenario, security means that the legitimate users should not learn anything beyond this specification.
That is, Alice should not learn anything about y and Bob should not learn anything about x, other than what they
may be able to infer from the value of f(x, y). Classically, it is possible to solve this task if one is willing to make
computational assumptions, such as that factoring of large integers is difficult. Sadly, these assumptions remain
unproven. Unfortunately, even quantum mechanics does not allow us to implement such interesting cryptographic
primitives without further assumptions [3–7].
A. The noisy-storage model
The noisy-storage model (NSM) allows us to obtain secure two-party protocols under the physical assumption
that any cheating party does not posses a large reliable quantum storage. First introduced in [8, 9], the NSM
has recently [10] been shown to encompass both the case where the adversary has a bounded amount of noise-free
storage [11, 12] (also known as the bounded-storage model), as well as the case where the adversary has access
to a potentially large amount of noisy storage. This last assumption is well justified given the state of present day
technology, and the fact that merely transferring the state of a photonic qubit onto a different carrier (such as an atomic
ensemble) is typically already noisy, even if the resulting quantum memory is perfect. In the protocols considered, the
honest parties themselves do not require any quantum storage at all. We briefly review the NSM here for completeness.
Without loss of generality, noisy quantum storage is described by a family of completely positive trace-preserving maps
{Ft : B(Hin)→ B(Hout)}t>0, where t is the time that the adversary uses his storage device. An input state ρ on Hin
stored at time t0 = 0 decoheres over time, resulting in a state Ft(ρ) of the memory at time t. We make the minimal
assumption that the noise is Markovian, meaning that the adversary does not gain any advantage by delaying the
readout whenever he wants to retrieve encoded information: waiting longer only degrades the information further. The
only assumption underlying the noisy-storage model consists in demanding that the adversary can only keep quantum
information in this noisy storage device. In particular, he is otherwise completely unrestricted – for example, he can
perform arbitrary (instantaneous) quantum computations using information from the storage device and additional
ancillas. In particular, he is able to perform perfect, noise-free, quantum computation and communication. However,
after his computation he needs to discard all quantum information except what is contained in the storage device,
where he may prepare an arbitrary encoded state on Hin. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.
How can we obtain security from such a physical assumption? We consider protocols which force the adversary to
store quantum information for extended periods to gain information: This is achieved by using certain time delays ∆t
at specific points in the protocol (e.g., before starting a round of communication). This forces the adversary to use
his device for a time at least ∆t if he wants to preserve quantum information. Due to the Markovian assumption, it
suffices to analyze security for the channel F = F∆t. Hence the security model can be summarized as follows:
• The adversary has unlimited classical storage, and (quantum) computational resources. He is able to perform
any operations noise-free and has access to a noise-free quantum channel.
4FIG. 2: During waiting times ∆t, the adversary must use his noisy-quantum storage described by the CPTP map F . Before
using his quantum storage, he performs any (error-free) “encoding attack” of his choosing, which consists of a measurement or
an encoding into an error-correcting code. After time ∆t, he receives some additional information that he can use for decoding.
• Whenever the protocol requires the adversary to wait for a time ∆t, he has to measure/discard all his quantum
information except what he can encode (arbitrarily) into Hin. This information then undergoes noise described
by F .
We stress that in contrast to the adversary’s potential resources allowed in this model, the technological demands
on honest parties are minimal: in our protocol, honest parties merely need to prepare and measure BB84-encoded
qubits [43] and do not require any quantum storage.
B. Challenges in a practical implementation
In this work we focus on how to put the protocols of [10] into practice. Unfortunately, the theoretical analysis
of [10] assumes perfect single-photon sources that are not available yet [13, 14]. Here, we remove this assumption
leading to a slightly modified protocol that can be implemented immediately using today’s technology. At first glance,
it may appear that the security analysis for a practical implementation differs little from the problems encountered
in practical realizations of QKD. After all, the quantum communication part of the protocols in [10] consists of Alice
sending BB84 states to Bob. Yet, since now the legitimate users do not trust each other, the analysis differs from
QKD in several fundamental aspects. Intuitively, these differences arise because Alice and Bob do not cooperate to
check on an outside eavesdropper. Quite on the contrary, Alice can never rely on anything that Bob says. A second
important aspect that differentiates the setting in [10] from QKD lies in the task the cryptographic protocols aim to
solve. For instance, secure identification is particularly interesting at extremely short distances, for which Alice would
ideally use a small, low power, portable device. Bob, on the other hand, may use more bulky detectors. At such short
distances, we could furthermore use visible light for which much better detectors exist than those typically used in
QKD at telecom wavelengths. It is an interesting experimental challenge to come up with suitable devices. Small
handheld setups have been proposed to perform QKD at short distance [15], which we can also hope to use here. The
QKD devices of [15] have been devised to distribute non-reusable authentication keys which could also be employed
for identification. At such short distance, this could also be achieved by for example loading keys onto a USB stick
at a trusted loading station at a bank for instance. We emphasize that our work is in spirit very different in that we
allow authentication keys to be reused over and over again, just as traditional passwords [16].
We first analyze a generic experimental setup in Section II. More specifically, we present a source-independent
characterization of such a setup and discuss all parameters that are necessary to evaluate security in the NSM.
Especially important is that in any real-world setting even the honest parties do not have access to perfect quantum
operations, and the channel connecting Alice and Bob is usually noisy. The challenge we face is to enable the honest
parties to execute the protocol successfully in the presence of errors, while ensuring that the protocol remains secure
against any cheating party. We shall always assume a worst-case scenario where a cheating party is able to perform
5FIG. 3: A general setup for weak string erasure.
perfect quantum operations and does not experience channel noise, its only restriction is its noisy quantum storage.
The primary source of errors at short distances lies in the low detector efficiencies of present day single-photon
detectors. For telecom wavelengths these detector efficiencies ηD lie at roughly 10%, where at visible wavelengths one
can use detectors of about 70% efficiency. Hence, a considerable part of the transmissions will be lost. In Section III,
we augment the protocol for weak string erasure presented in [10] to deal with such erasure errors. This protocol is
the main ingredient to realize the primitive of oblivious transfer, which can be used to solve the problem of computing
a function f(x, y). The second source of errors lies in bit errors which result from noise on the channel itself or
imperfections in Alice and Bob’s measurement apparatus. At short distances, such errors will typically be quite small.
In Section IV, we show how to augment the protocol for oblivious transfer to deal with bit errors. It should be noted
that we treat these errors in the classical communication part of the protocols, independently of erasure errors, and
similar techniques may be used in other schemes based on weak string erasure in the future.
To obtain security, we have to make a reasonable estimation of the errors that the honest parties expect to occur. We
state the necessary parameters in Section II and provide concrete estimates for two experimental setups in Section V.
In particular, we present explicit security parameters for a source of weak coherent pulses, and a parametric down
conversion (PDC) source. Throughout, we assume that the reader is familiar with commonly used entropic quantities
also relevant for QKD, and quantum information. An introduction to all concepts relevant for security in the NSM is
given in [10].
II. GENERAL SETUP
Before turning to the actual protocols, we need to investigate the parameters involved in an experimental setup.
The quantum communication part of all the protocols in the NSM is a simple scheme for weak string erasure which
we will describe in detail in the next section. In each round of this protocol, Alice chooses one of the four possible
BB84 states [17] at random and sends this state to Bob. Bob now measures randomly the state received either in the
computational or in the Hadamard basis. Such a setup is characterized by a source held by Alice, and a measurement
apparatus held by Bob as depicted in Figure 3. The source can as well include a measurement device, depending
on the actual state preparation process (e.g. when a PDC source acts as a triggered single-photon source). If Alice
is honest, we can trust the source entirely, which means that in principle we have full knowledge of its parameters.
Note, however, that in any practical setting the parameters of the source will undergo small fluctuations. For clarity
of exposition, we do not take these fluctuations into account explicitly, but assume that all the parameters below are
worst-case estimates of what we can reasonably expect from our source.
A. Source parameters
Unfortunately, we do not have access to a perfect single-photon source in a practical setting [13, 14], but can only
arrange the source to emit a certain number of photons with a certain probability. To approximate a single-photon
source, we will later let Alice perform some measurements herself to exclude multi-photon events in the case of a PDC
source. The following table summarizes the two relevant probabilities we need to know in any implementation. When
using decoy states, we will frequently add an index s to all parameters to specify a particular source s that is used.
probability description
pnsrc the source emits n photons.
pnsent the source emits n photons conditioned on the event
that Alice concludes that one photon has been emitted.
6In our analysis, we will be interested in bounding the number of single-photon emissions in M rounds of the protocol,
which can be achieved using the well-known Chernoff’s inequality (see e.g. [18]): Suppose we have a source that emits
a single photon with probability p1src and a different number of photons otherwise. How many single-photon emissions
do we expect? Intuitively, it is clear that in M rounds we have roughly p1srcM many. Yet, in the following we need to
consider a small interval around p1srcM , such that the probability that we do not fall into this interval is extremely
small. More precisely, we want that
Pr[|S − p1srcM | ≥ ζ1srcM ] ≤ ε, (1)
where S is the number of single-photon emissions. To apply Chernoff’s inequality, let Xj = 1 denote the event where
a single-photon emission occurred, and let Xj = 0 otherwise, giving us S =
∑
j Xj . We then demand that
2e−2(ζ
1
src)
2M ≤ ε, (2)
which can be achieved by choosing ζ1src =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2M). Operationally this means that the number of single-
photon emissions lies in the interval [(p1src − ζ1src)M, (p1src + ζ1src)M ], except with probability ε. Note that for M
being very large we indeed have ζ1src ≈ 0, leaving us with approximately p1srcM many single-photon emissions. By
exactly the same argument, if nowM refers to the number of rounds in the protocol where Alice concluded the source
emitted single-photons, the actual number of single-photon rounds within these post-selected events lies in the interval
[(p1sent − ζ1sent)M, (p1sent + ζ1sent)M ] for ζ1sent =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2M), except with probability ε. We will make use of this
argument repeatedly and use ζxy to denote the interval when considering an event that occurs with probabiity p
x
y .
We would like to emphasize that for our security proof to work, we only need a conservative lower bound on the
number of single-photon emissions. Should there be some intensity fluctuations in Alice’s laser provided that we know
the worst case (i.e., a conservative lower bound p1src) in the asymptotic case of large M , then the discussion for the
finite-size case will go through if we consider a one-sided bound in Equation (1). i.e., Pr[S ≤ (p1src − ζ1src)M ] ≤ ε.
B. Error parameters
For any setup, we need to determine the following error parameters. These parameters should be a reasonable
estimate that is made once for a particular experimental implementation and fixed during subsequent executions of
the protocol. For instance, for a given device meant to be used for identification, these estimates would be fixed
during construction.
1. Losses
As mentioned above, the primary restriction in a practical setting arises from the loss of signals. These losses can
occur on the channel, or be caused by detector inefficiencies. The following table summarizes all the probabilities we
need. Throughout, we use the superscripts h and d to indicate that these parameters apply to an honest or dishonest
party respectively.
probability description
pnerase n photons are erased on the channel
phB,click honest Bob observes a click in his detection apparatus
phB,no click honest Bob observes no click in his detection apparatus
p
h|n
B,click honest Bob observes a click in his detection apparatus,
conditioned on the event that Alice sent n photons.
phB,S,no click honest Bob observes no click from the signal alone
pdark an honest player obtains a click when the signal was a vacuum state (dark count)
Note that we have
phB,no click =
∞∑
n=0
pnsrc p
h|n
B,no click , (3)
and again the number of rounds we expect to be lost can be bounded to lie in the interval [(phB,no click −
ζhB,no click)M, (p
h
B,no click + ζ
h
B,no click)M ] with ζ
h
B,no click =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2M), except with probability ε.
72. Bit errors
The second source of errors are bit-flip errors that can occur due to imperfections in Alice’s or Bob’s measurement
apparatus or due to noise on the channel. We use the following notation for the probability of such an event in the
case that Bob is honest. This probability depends on the detection error edet in our experimental setup, i.e., on the
probability that a signal sent by Alice produces a click in the erroneous detector on Bob’s side, and on pdark. The
quantity edet characterizes the alignment and stability of the optical system.
parameter description
edet detection error
phB,err honest Bob outputs the wrong bit
For a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}, a bit-flip error is described by the classical binary symmetric channel with error parameter
perr
Sperr(b) =
{
b with probability 1− perr ,
(1 − b) with probability perr .
(4)
When each bit of a k-bit string is independently affected by bit-flip errors, the noise can be described by the channel
Eperr = S⊗kperr , (5)
where we omit the explicit reference to k on the l.h.s. when it is clear from the context.
C. Parameters for dishonest Bob
Recall our conservative assumption that a dishonest party is only restricted by its noisy quantum storage, but can
otherwise perform perfect quantum operations and has access to a perfect channel. Yet, even for a dishonest Bob
there are some errors he cannot avoid, caused by the imperfections in Alice’s apparatus. If Alice’s source simply
outputs no photon for example, then even a dishonest Bob cannot detect the transmission which is captured by the
following parameter.
probability description
pdB,no click dishonest Bob observes no click in his detection apparatus
Generally, we have pdB,no click = p
0
sent. In the protocols that follow, we will ask an honest Bob to report any round
as missing that has not resulted in a click. Without loss of generality, we can assume that even a dishonest Bob
will report a particular round as lost when he does not observe a click. Of course, if Bob is dishonest he potentially
chooses to report additional rounds as missing.
In our analysis, we also have to evaluate the following probability which depends on the experimental setup, as well
as on our choice of protocol parameters.
probability description
pd,nB,err dishonest Bob outputs the wrong bit if Alice sent n photons,
and he gets the basis information for free
8FIG. 4: Weak string erasure with errors when both parties are honest. Eperr denotes the bit-error channel defined in (5).
III. WEAK STRING ERASURE WITH ERRORS
The basic quantum primitive upon which all other protocols in [10] are based is called weak string erasure. In-
tuitively, weak string erasure provides Alice with a random m-bit string Xm and Bob with a random set of indices
I ∈ 2[m] and the substring XI of Xm restricted to the elements in I [44]. If Bob is honest, then we demand that
whatever attack dishonest Alice mounts, she cannot gain any information about which bits Bob has learned. That is,
she cannot gain any information about I. If Alice herself is honest, we demand that the amount of information that
Bob can gain about the string Xm is limited.
We now present an augmented version of the weak string erasure protocol proposed in [10] that allows us to deal
with the inevitable errors encountered during a practical implementation. We thereby address the two possible errors
separately: losses are dealt with directly in weak string erasure. Bit-flip errors, however, are not corrected in weak
string erasure itself, but in subsequent protocols [45]. We will thus implement weak string erasure with errors where
the substring XI is allowed to be affected by bit-flip errors. That is, honest Bob actually receives Eperr(XI) where
Eperr is the classical channel corresponding to the bit errors as given in (5), with k = |I| being the length of the string
XI . Figure 4 provides an intuitive description of this task.
We now provide an informal definition of weak string erasure with errors. A formal definition can be found in
Appendix A. Even in this informal definition we need to quantify the knowledge that a cheating Bob has about
the string Xm given access to his entire system B′ [46]. This quantity has a simple interpretation in terms of the
min-entropy as H∞(X
m|B′) = − logPguess(Xm|B′), where Pguess(Xm|B′) represents the probability that Bob guesses
Xm, maximized over all measurements of the quantum part B′. The quantity Hε∞(X
m|B′) thereby behaves like
H∞(X
m|B′), except with probability ε. We refer to [10] for an introduction to these quantities and their use in the
NSM.
Definition III.1 (Informal). An (m,λ, ε, perr)-weak string erasure protocol with errors (WSEE) is a protocol between
Alice and Bob satisfying the following properties, where Eperr is defined as in (5):
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then Alice obtains a randomly chosen m-bit string Xm ∈ {0, 1}m, and Bob
obtains a randomly chosen subset I ⊆ [m], as well as the string Eperr(XI).
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then the amount of information Bob has about Xm is limited to
1
m
Hε∞(X
m|B′) ≥ λ , (6)
where B′ denotes the total state of Bob’s system.
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then Alice learns nothing about I.
We are now ready to state a simple protocol for WSEE. We thereby introduce explicit time slots into the protocol.
If Alice herself concludes that no photon or a multi-photon has been emitted in a particular time slot, she simply
discards this round and tells Bob to discard this round as well. Since this action represents no security problem for
us, we will for simplicity omit these rounds all-together when stating the protocol below. This means that the number
of rounds M in the protocol below, actually refers to the set of post-selected pulses that Alice did count as a valid
round.
In addition, introducing time slots enables Bob to report a particular bit as missing, if he has obtained no click in a
particular time slot. Alice and Bob will subsequently discard all missing rounds. This does pose a potential security
risk, which we need to analyze and hence we explicitly include this step in the protocol below.
9Protocol 1: Weak String Erasure with Errors (WSEE)
Outputs: xm ∈ {0, 1}m to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈ 2[m] × {0, 1}|I| to Bob.
1. Alice: Chooses a string xM ∈R {0, 1}M and basis-specifying string θM ∈R {0, 1}M uniformly at random.
2. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜M ∈R {0, 1}M uniformly at random.
3. In time slot i = 1, . . . ,M (considered a valid round by Alice):
1. Alice: Encodes bit xi in the basis given by θi (i.e., as H
θi |xi〉), and sends the resulting state to Bob.
2. Bob: Measures in the basis given by θ˜i to obtain outcome x˜i. If Bob obtains no click in this time slot,
he records round i as missing.
4. Bob: Reports to Alice which rounds were missing.
5. Alice: If the number of rounds that Bob reported missing does not lie in the interval [(phB,no click −
ζhB,no click)M, (p
h
B,no click+ ζ
h
B,no click)M ], then Alice aborts the protocol. Otherwise, she deletes all bits from
xM that Bob reported missing. Let xm ∈ {0, 1}m denote the remaining bit string, and let θm be the
basis-specifying string for the remaining rounds. Let θ˜m, and x˜m be the corresponding strings for Bob.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
6. Alice: Sends the basis information θm to Bob, and outputs xm.
7. Bob: Computes I := {i ∈ [m] | θi = θ˜i}, and outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
A. Security analysis
1. Parameters
We prove the security of Protocol 1 in Appendix A, where our analysis forms an extension of the proof presented
in [10]. The security proof for dishonest Alice is analogous to [10]. The only novelty is to ensure that allowing Bob
to report rounds as missing does not compromise the security. Here, we focus on weak string erasure with errors,
when the adversary’s storage is of the form F = N⊗νMstore , and N obeys the strong converse property [19]. An
important example is the d-dimensional depolarizing channel. For this case, we can give explicit security parameters
in terms of the amount of noise generated by N . The quantity ν denotes the storage rate, and Mstore is the number
of single-photon emissions that we expect an honest Bob to receive for large M . That is
Mstore := p
1
sent · ph|1B,click ·M . (7)
We hence allow Bob’s storage size to be determined as in the idealized setting of [10], where we have only single-photon
emissions. Throughout, we let M (n) denote the number of n photon emissions in M valid rounds, and use r(n) to
denote the fraction of these n-photon pulses that Bob decides to report as missing. Clearly, r(n) is not a parameter
we can evaluate, but depends on the strategy of dishonest Bob. Finally, we use M
(n)
left = (1− r(n))M (n) to denote the
number of n-photon pulses that are left. Note that M
(n)
left is a function of r
(n) chosen by Bob according to certain
constraints which we investigate later. A proof of Theorem III.2, as well as a generalization to other channels F not
necessarily of the form F = N⊗νMstore , can be found in Appendix A. Here, we state the theorem for a worst-case
setting which can be obtained using (A29). This result is independent of the actual choice of signals that Bob chooses
to report as missing. For simplicity, we present the theorem omitting terms that vanish for large M . These terms
are, however, considered in Appendix A.
Theorem III.2 (WSEE). Let Bob’s storage be given by F = N⊗νMstore for a storage rate ν > 0, N satisfying the
strong converse property [19] and having capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν <
(
1
2
− δ
)
p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click
p1sent · ph|1B,click
. (8)
10
Then Protocol 1 is an (m,λ(δ), ε(δ), phB,err)-weak string erasure protocol with errors with the following parameters: Let
δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then the min-entropy rate λ(δ) is given by
λ(δ) = min
{r(n)}n
1
m
[
ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
·Mstore −
∞∑
n=2
M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
, (9)
where γN is the strong converse parameter of N (see (15)) and the minimization is taken over all {r(n)}n such that∑∞
n=1 r
(n)M (n) ≤Mdreport, Mstore is given by (7), and
m =
∑∞
n=1M
(n)
left (the number of remaining rounds) ,
Mdreport = (p
h
B,no click − pdB,no click)M (the number of rounds dishonest Bob can report missing) ,
R =
(
1
2 − δ
)
1−r(1)
p
h|1
B,click
(the rate at which dishonest Bob has to send information through storage) ,
for sufficiently large M . The error has the form
ε(δ) ≤ 4 exp
(
− δ
2
512(4 + log 1δ )
2
· (p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click)M
)
. (10)
What kind of channels N : B(Hin) → B(Hout) satisfy the strong converse property? It was recently shown
in [19] that all channels for which the maximum α-norm is multiplicative, and which are group covariant, that is
N (gρg†) = gN (ρ)g† for all g ∈ G where g acts irreducibly on the output space Hout, satisfy this property. An
important example of such a channel is the d-dimensional depolarizing channel given as
Nr(ρ) := rρ + (1− r) I
d
, (11)
which replaces the input state ρ with the completely mixed state I/d with probability 1− r. Security parameters for
this channel can be found in [10] for the case of a perfect setup with a single-photon source, assuming no errors nor
detection inefficiencies.
2. Limits to security
Before analyzing in detail concrete practical implementations based on a weak coherent source, and a PDC source,
we investigate when security can be obtained at all for the d-dimensional depolarizing channel as a function of p1sent,
pdB,no click, p
h
B,no click, and p
h|1
B,no click in comparison to the storage parameters r and ν. Note that for the security
parameter ε(δ) to vanish we need
p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click > 0 . (12)
Second, we require (in the limit of large M where we may choose δ → 0) that
CNr · ν <
1
2
p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click
p1sent · ph|1B,click
, (13)
where CNr is given by [20]
CNr = log d+
(
r +
1− r
d
)
log
(
r +
1− r
d
)
+ (d− 1)1− r
d
log
1− r
d
. (14)
In Sections VA and VB we provide sample trade-offs between r and ν for some typical values of the source parameters,
and the losses.
To determine the magnitude of the actual security parameters, we need to evaluate the strong converse parameter
γN [19]. In the case of the d-dimensional depolarizing channel it can be expressed as [10]
γN (Rˆ) := max
α≥1
α− 1
α
{
Rˆ− log d+ 1
1− α log
[(
r +
1− r
d
)α
+ (d− 1)
(
1− r
d
)α]}
. (15)
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For a general definition and discussion on how to evaluate this parameter for other channels see [10, 19]. For simplicity,
we consider here a setup where Bob always gains full information from a multi-photon emission, that is pd,nB,err = 0 for
n > 1. This means that he will never report any such rounds as missing, that is, r(n) = 0 for n > 1. From (A29) it
follows that
λ(δ) ≥ 1
m
{
ν · γN
[
1
ν
(
1
2
− δ
)
p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click
p1sent · ph|1B,click
]}
Mstore , (16)
providing the security conditions (12) and (13) are satisfied. In Sections VA and VB we plot λ(δ) for a variety of
parameter choices for a weak coherent and a PDC source respectively.
B. Using decoy states
We now consider a slight modification of the protocol above, where we make use of so-called decoy states as they
are also used in QKD [21–23]. The main idea consists of Alice randomly choosing a particular setting of her photon
source according to a distribution PS over some set of settings S for each state she sends to Bob. One of these settings
(signal setting) corresponds to the configuration of the source she would normally use to execute the weak string
erasure protocol above, all others (decoy settings) are used to test the behavior of dishonest Bob. In our setting, the
effect of using decoy states is that dishonest Bob needs to behave roughly the same as honest Bob when it comes to
choosing which rounds to report as missing. This enables us to place a better bound on the parameter r(1), which
can lead to a significant increase in the set of detection efficiencies for which we can hope to show security (e.g., for a
weak coherent source see Section VA3), and translates into an enhancement of the rate R given by (A26) and (A29)
at which the adversary needs to transmit information through his storage, if he wants to break the security of the
protocol.
We briefly describe how we make use of decoy states, before turning to the actual protocol. For each source setting,
Alice can compute the gain, that is, the probability that Bob observes a click. Here we consider only the number of
rounds M which Alice determines to be valid, and all probabilities are as explained in Section II conditioned on the
event that Alice declared the round to be valid. We can then write the gain of honest Bob when Alice uses setting s,
averaged over all possible numbers of photons, as
Qhs = p
h
B,click,s =
∞∑
n=0
pnsent,sp
h|n
B,click . (17)
Note that p
h|n
B,click thereby does not depend on the source setting s, even though Bob can gain information about the
setting s by making a photon number measurement, since not all photon numbers are equally likely to occur for the
different settings. Yet, since the photon number is the only information that Bob obtains, we can without loss of
generality assume that his strategy is deterministic and depends only on the observed photon number. By counting
the number of rounds that Bob reports missing, Alice obtains an estimate of this gain as
Qmeass =
Mleft,s
Ms
. (18)
The parameterMs denotes the number of valid rounds in which Alice uses setting s, andMleft,s represents the number
of such rounds that Bob did not report as missing. For an honest Bob, we have Qmeass ≈ Qhs in the limit of large Ms.
For finite Ms, we conclude that Mleft,s lies in the interval [(Q
h
s − ζhs )Ms, (Qhs + ζhs )Ms], except with probability ε. In
the protocol below, Alice will hence abort if Mleft,s lies outside this interval for any setting s ∈ S.
From the observed quantities Qmeass for different settings, Alice can obtain a lower bound on the yield of the single-
photon emissions following standard techniques used in decoy state QKD [21–24]. Let us denote this lower bound
as τ . For honest Bob, the yield of single photons is of course just p
h|1
B,click as honest Bob always reports a round as
missing if he did not observe a click. For dishonest Bob, placing a bound on this yield corresponds to placing a bound
on 1− r(1), which in the limit of large M can be seen as the probability that dishonest Bob does not choose to report
a round as missing. Hence, we can use decoy states to obtain an estimate for the parameter r(1) as
r(1) ≤ 1− τ , (19)
even if Bob is dishonest. In Section V we provide an explicit expression for τ for the case of a source emitting
phase-randomized coherent states.
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Protocol 2: Weak String Erasure with Errors (WSEE) using decoy states
Outputs: xm ∈ {0, 1}m to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈ 2[m] × {0, 1}|I| to Bob.
1. Alice: Chooses a string xMˆ ∈R {0, 1}Mˆ and basis-specifying string θMˆ ∈R {0, 1}Mˆ uniformly at random.
2. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜Mˆ ∈R {0, 1}Mˆ uniformly at random. He initializes M← ∅.
3. In time slot i = 1, . . . , Mˆ :
1. Alice: Chooses a source setting si ∈ S with probability PS(si). Encodes bit xi in the basis given by θi
(i.e., as Hθi |xi〉), and sends the resulting state to Bob.
2. Bob: Measures in the basis given by θ˜i to obtain outcome x˜i. If Bob obtains no click in this time slot,
he records round i as missing by letting M←M∪ {i}.
4. Bob: Reports to Alice which rounds were missing by sending M.
4’. Alice: For each possible source setting s ∈ S, Alice computes the set of missing rounds Ms = {i ∈ M |
si = s}. Let Mˆs = |{j ∈ [Mˆ ] | sj = s}| be the number of rounds sent using setting s.
5. Alice: For each source setting s ∈ S: if the number of rounds that Bob reported missing does not lie
in the interval [(phB,no click,s − ζhB,no click,s)Mˆs, (phB,no click,s + ζhB,no click,s)Mˆs], then Alice aborts the protocol.
Otherwise, she deletes all bits from xMˆ that Bob reported missing, and all bits that correspond to decoy
state settings s ∈ S. Let xm ∈ {0, 1}m denote the remaining bit string, and let θm be the basis-specifying
string for the remaining rounds. Let θ˜m, and x˜m be the corresponding strings for Bob.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
6. Alice: Informs Bob which rounds remain and sends the basis information θm to Bob, and outputs xm.
7. Bob: Computes I := {i ∈ [m] | θi = θ˜i}, and outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
We now state the security parameters for this protocol for the case of large Ms = Mˆs for each possible source. The
only difference to the previous statement is that we replace the bound on the rate (A29) with the bound obtained by
bounding r(1) as in (19). The parameter M refers to the number of valid pulses coming from the signal setting. The
decoy pulses are merely used as an estimate, and play no further role in the protocol. However, the probability ε to
make a correctness or security error is increased by ε for every interval check Alice does. As she does one check per
source setting, we get a factor of 1 + |S| increase in the error probability.
Theorem III.3 (WSEE with decoy states). Let M = Mˆsignal. When Bob’s storage is given by F = N⊗νMstore for a
storage rate ν > 0, with N satisfying the strong converse property [19], and having capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν <
(
1
2
− δ
)
τ
p
h|1
B,click
, (20)
with τ ≤ 1−r(1), then Protocol 1 is an (m,λ(δ), ε(δ), phB,err)-weak string erasure protocol with errors with the following
parameters: Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then the min-entropy rate λ(δ) is given by
λ(δ) = min
{r(n)}n
1
m
[
ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
Mstore −
∞∑
n=2
M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
, (21)
where γN is the strong converse parameter of N (see (15)) and the minimization is taken over all {r(n)}n with
1− r(1) ≥ τ such that ∑∞n=1 r(n)M (n) ≤Mdreport and
m =
∞∑
n=1
M
(n)
left , Mstore = p
1
sent · ph|1B,click ·M (22)
R =
(
1
2
− δ
)
1− r(1)
p
h|1
B,click
, Mdreport = (p
h
B,no click − pdB,no click)M , (23)
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FIG. 5: 1-2 oblivious transfer from fully randomized transfer by sending additional messages given by the dashed lines.
for sufficiently large M . The error has the form
ε(δ) ≤ (1 + |S|) · 2 exp
(
− δ
2
512(4 + log 1δ )
2
· τ p1sentM
)
. (24)
IV. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER FROM WSEE
We now show how to obtain oblivious transfer from WSEE. Here we implement a fully randomized oblivious transfer
protocol (FROT), which can easily be converted into 1-2 oblivious transfer as shown in Figure 5. We now give an
informal description of this task, and refer to [10] for a formal definition.
Definition IV.1 (Informal). An (ℓ, ε)-fully randomized oblivious transfer protocol (FROT) is a protocol between two
parties, Alice and Bob, satisfying the following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then Alice obtains two random strings S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and Bob obtains a
random choice bit C ∈ {0, 1} as well as SC .
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then there exists C ∈ {0, 1} such that given SC, Bob cannot learn anything
about S1−C , except with probability ε.
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then Alice learns nothing about C.
A. Ingredients
1. Suitable error-correcting codes
To deal with the bit-flip errors in the weak string erasure we need to augment the protocol of [10] with an additional
error-correction step as in [25]. That is, Alice has to send some small amount of error-correcting information to Bob.
The challenge we face is to ensure that security is preserved: Recall that if Bob is dishonest, we assume a worst-case
scenario where he does not experience any transmission errors and he can perform perfect quantum operations. Hence,
he could use this additional error-correcting information to correct some of the errors caused by his noisy quantum
storage. On the other hand, if Alice is dishonest, we have to guarantee that the error-correcting process does not
allow her to gain any information about the choice bit C. This last requirement can be achieved by using a one-way
(or forward) error-correcting code in which only Alice sends information to Bob [47]. Let {Cn} be a family of linear
error-correcting codes of length n capable of efficiently correcting perr ·n errors. For a k-bit string xk, error correction
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is done by sending the syndrome information syn(xk) to Bob who can then efficiently recover xk from his noisy string
Eperr(xk). For instance, low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes can correct a k-bit string, where each bit flipped with
probability perr, by sending at most 1.2 · h(perr) · k bits of error-correcting information [26].
2. Interactive hashing
Apart from an error-correcting code, the protocol below requires three classical ingredients that need to be imple-
mented: First, we need to use the primitive of interactive hashing of subsets. This is a classical protocol in which
Bob holds as input a subset W t ⊆ [α] (where α is some natural number) and Alice has no input. Both Alice and Bob
receive two subsets W t0 ,W
t
1 ⊆ [α] as outputs, where there exists some C ∈ {0, 1} such that W tC = W t as depicted in
Figure 6. Informally, security means that Alice does not learn C, and W t1−C is chosen almost at random from the set
FIG. 6: Interactive hashing
of all possible subsets of [α]. That is, Bob has very little control over the choice of W t1−C . Here we restrict ourselves
to this definition and refer to [10] for a formal definition. In order to perform interactive hashing, we describe below
how to encode the input subsets into a t-bit string. Intuitively, interactive hashing can be done by Alice asking Bob
for random parities of his t-bit string W . After t− 1 linearly independent queries, there are only two possible strings
left: one of which is Bob’s original input, the other one is pretty much out of his control. A concrete protocol for
interactive hashing can be found, for instance, in [27].
3. Encoding of subsets
The second ingredient we need is thus an encoding of subsets as bit strings. More precisely, we map t-bit strings
to subsets using Enc : {0, 1}t → T , where T is the set of all subsets of [α] of size α/4. Here we assume without loss
of generality that α is a multiple of 4. The encoding Enc is injective, that is, no two strings are mapped to the same
subset. Below, we furthermore choose t such that 2t ≤ ( αα/4) ≤ 2 · 2t. This means that not all possible subsets are
encoded, but at least half of them. We refer to [27, 28] for details on how to obtain such an encoding.
4. Two-universal hashing
Finally, we require the use of two-universal hash functions for privacy amplification as they are also used in QKD [29].
Any implementation used for QKD may be used here. Below, we use R to denote the set of possible hash functions,
and use Ext(X,R) to represent the output of the hash function given by R when applied to the string X .
B. Protocol
Before providing a detailed description of the protocol, we first give a description of the different steps involved in
Figure 7.
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FIG. 7: Conceptual steps in the protocol for FROT from WSEE.
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Protocol 3: WSEE-to-FROT
Parameters: Integers m,β such that α := m/β is a multiple of 4. Set t := α/2. Outputs: (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ×{0, 1}ℓ
to Alice, and (c, yℓ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to Bob
1: Alice and Bob: Execute (m,λ, ε, perr)-WSEE. Alice obtains a string x
m ∈ {0, 1}m, Bob a set I ⊂ [m] and
a string s = Eperr(xI). If |I| < m/4, Bob aborts. Otherwise, he randomly truncates I to the size m/4, and
deletes the corresponding values in s.
We arrange xm into a matrix z ∈ Mα×β({0, 1}), by zj,k := x(j−1)·β+k for (j, k) ∈ [α]× [β].
2: Bob:
1. Randomly chooses a string wt ∈R {0, 1}t corresponding to an encoding of a subset Enc(wt) of [α] with
α/4 elements.
2. Randomly partitions the m bits of xm into α blocks of β bits each: He randomly chooses a permutation
π : [α] × [β] → [α] × [β] of the entries of z such that he knows π(z)Enc(wt) (that is, these bits are
permutation of the bits of s). Formally, π is uniform over permutations satisfying the following condition:
for all (j, k) ∈ [α]× [β] and (j′, k′) := π(j, k), we have (j − 1) · β + k ∈ I if and only if j′ ∈ Enc(wt).
3. Bob sends π to Alice.
3: Alice and Bob: Execute interactive hashing with Bob’s input equal to wt. They obtain wt0, w
t
1 ∈ {0, 1}t
with wt ∈ {wt0, wt1}.
4: Alice: Sends error-correcting information for every block in Enc(wt0) and Enc(w
t
1), i.e., ∀j ∈ Enc(wt0) ∪
Enc(wt1), Alice sends Syn(π(z)j) to Bob.
5: Alice: Chooses r0, r1 ∈R R and sends them to Bob.
6: Alice: Outputs (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) := (Ext(π(z)Enc(wt0), r0),Ext(π(z)Enc(wt1), r1)).
7: Bob: Computes c, where wt = wtc, and π(z)Enc(wt) from s. Performs error correction on the blocks of
π(z)Enc(wt). He outputs (c, y
ℓ) := (c,Ext(π(z)Enc(wt), rc)).
When using WSEE to obtain FROT, Protocol 3 achieves the following parameters. The proof of this statement
can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem IV.2 (Oblivious transfer). For any constant ω ≥ 2 and β ≥ max{67, 256ω2/λ2}, the protocol WSEE-to-
FROT implements an (ℓ, 41 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
m
+ 2ε)-FROT from one instance of (m,λ, ε, perr)-WSEE, where
ℓ :=
⌊((
ω − 1
ω
)
λ
8
− λ
2
512ω2β
− 1.2 · h(perr)
8
)
m− 1
2
⌋
.
The parameter ω appearing in the theorem above is an additional parameter that we can tune to trade off a higher
rate of OT, against an error that decays more slowly. Our choice of ω will thereby depend on the error perr: Note that
for large values of ω, we can essentially achieve security as long as λ > h(perr) (see Figure 8). Of course, this requires
us to use many more rounds to be able to achieve the desired block size β, as well as to make the error sufficiently
small again. Using more rounds, however, may be much easier than to decrease the bit error rate of the channel.
V. SECURITY FOR TWO CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATIONS
We now show how our security analysis applies to two particular experimental setups using weak coherent pulses
or a parametric down conversion source. Unlike in QKD, our protocols are particularly interesting at short distance,
where one may use visible light for which better detectors exist.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Security can be achieved if (perr, λ) lies in the shaded region, where we chose a very large value of
ω = 100000.
E
n
c
o
d
e
r
Alice
Channel + or × PB
Bob
PSPhase
randomized
coherent 
states
FIG. 9: Experimental setup with phase-randomized weak coherent pulses. The Encoder codifies the BB84 signal information.
The polarization shifter (PS) allows to change the polarization basis (computational basis + or Hadamard basis ×) of the
measurement as desired. The polarization analyzer consists of a polarizing beam splitter (PB) and two threshold detectors.
The PB discriminates the two orthogonal polarized modes.
A. Phase-randomized weak coherent pulses
1. Experimental setup and loss model
We first consider a phase-randomized weak coherent source. The basic setup for Alice and Bob is illustrated in
Figure 9. The signal states sent by Alice can be described as
ρk = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|nk〉〈nk|, (25)
where the signals |nk〉 denote Fock states with n photons in one of the four possible polarization states of the BB84
scheme, which are labeled with the index k.
On the receiving side, we shall assume that honest Bob uses an active-basis-choice measurement setup. It consists
of a polarization analyzer and a polarization shifter which effectively changes the polarization basis of the subsequent
measurement. The polarization analyzer has two threshold detectors, each monitoring the output of a polarizing
beam splitter. These detectors are characterized by their detection efficiency η and their dark-count probability pdark.
Notice that we include all sources of loss in the system (including channel loss, coupling loss in Alice’s and Bob’s
laboratory etc.) in the definition of the detection efficiency η [48]. For the case of honest Alice and Bob, the overall
transmittance, η, is a product. i.e., η = ηAηchannelηBηD where ηA is the transmittance on Alice’s side, ηchannel is the
channel transmittance, ηB is the transmittance on Bob’s side (excluding detection inefficiency) and ηD is the detector
efficiency defined previously in the introductory section. Recall, from the introductory section, that ηD is about 10%
for telecom wavelengths and 70% for visible wavelengths.
Now, for some practical set-ups (such as short-distance free-space with visible wavelength), it is probably techno-
logically feasible to achieve ηAηchannelηB of order 1, say 50 percents. In more detail, in some set-ups (e.g. with a
weak coherent state source), Alice may compensate for her internal loss by characterizing it and then simply turning
up the intensity of her laser. In those cases, she may effectively set ηA = 1. Now, for short-distance applications,
ηchannel, can be made of order 1. All that is required to achieve ηAηchannelηB of order 1 is to reduce Bob’s internal
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loss, thus boosting ηB to order 1. For simplicity, we consider that both detectors have equal parameters. Since we
absorb all terms into the detector inefficiency, we simply refer to this as η.
As in QKD [30], the fact that each signal state is phase-randomized is an important element for our security analysis.
It allows us to argue that, without loss of generality, a dishonest Bob always performs a quantum nondemolition
(QND) measurement of the total number of photons contained in each pulse sent by Alice. Hence, we can analyze
the single-photon pulses separately from the multi-photon pulses, which makes an important difference for Bob’s
cheating capabilities. In Appendix C, we compute all relevant probabilities to evaluate security in this scenario.
These probabilities are summarized in the following Table I. For completeness, we explicitly state some parameters
which we need in order to evaluate the error probability phB,err. These parameters are: the probability that Bob makes
an error due to dark counts alone (pB,D,err), the signal alone (pB,S,err), and the probability that he makes an error
due to dark counts and the signal (pB,DS,err), as well as the probability that a signal alone produces no click in Bob’s
side (phB,S,no click).
Parameter Value
p1src e
−µµ
p1sent p
1
src
p
h|1
B,click η + (1− η)pdark(2− pdark)
pd,nB,err 0
pdB,no click e
−µ
phB,S,no click e
−µ∑∞
n=0
µn
n!
(1− η)n = e−ηµ
phB,no click p
h
B,S,no click − p
h
B,S,no clickpdark(2− pdark)
pB,D,err pdark(1− pdark) + p
2
dark/2
pB,DS,err (1− p
h
B,S,no click)
(
(1− edet)
pdark
2
+ edet · pdark(
3
2
− pdark)
)
phB,S,err edet(1− p
h
B,S,no click)
phB,err p
h
B,S,err(1− pdark(2− pdark)) + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,err + pB,DS,err
TABLE I: Summary of the probabilities for phase-randomized weak coherent pulses
2. Security parameters
To evaluate the probabilities above we assume that pdark = 0.85 ∗ 10−6 , and use edet = 0.033 as a very conservative
number on a distance of 122 km [31].
a. Weak string erasure We now investigate the security of (m,λ, ε, perr)-weak string erasure, when using a weak
coherent source. Before examining the weak string erasure rate λ that one can obtain for some set of source parameters,
we first consider when security can be obtained in principle (i.e., when (12) and (13) are satisfied) as a function of
the mean photon number µ, the detection efficiency η, the storage rate ν and the amount of storage noise. Our
examples here focus on the depolarizing channel with parameter r as defined in (11). First of all, Figure 10 tells us
when security is possible at all, independently of the amount of storage noise. We then examine a particular example
of storage noise and storage rates in Figure 11. This shows that even for low storage noise, we can hope to achieve
security for many source settings. Note that this plot is merely an example, and of course does not rule out security
of other forms of storage noise or other storage rates. The following plots have been made using Mathematica, and
the corresponding files used are available upon request.
We now consider when conditions (12) and (13) can be satisfied in terms of the amount of noise in storage given
by r, and the storage rate ν for some typical parameters in an experimental setup. Figure 12 shows us, that there is
a clear trade-off between r and ν dictating when weak string erasure can be obtained from our analysis, but typical
parameters of the source move us well within a possible region.
Now that we have established that secure weak string erasure can be obtained for a reasonable choice of parameters,
it remains to establish the weak string erasure rate λ. This parameter cannot be read off explicitly, but is determined
by the optimization problem given in (16). To gain some intuition about the magnitude of this parameter we plot it
in Figure 13 for various choices of experimental settings, and a storage rate of ν = 1. This shows that even for a very
high storage rate, there is a positive rate of λ for many reasonable settings. Of course λ can be larger if we were to
consider a lower storage rate.
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) in the
shaded region where (12) is fulfilled. Our proof does not
apply to parameters in the region below the curve. For
the shaded region above the curve, additional conditions
such as (13) are checked in the following Figure 11.
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) in the
upper enclosed regions for a low storage noise of r = 0.9
and storage rates ν of 1/2 (dashed red line), 0.45 (dot-
ted green line), 0.35 (dot dashed blue line), 0.25 (large
dashed magenta line), 0.15 (solid black line) (satisfy-
ing (12) and (13)).
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Security for (r, ν) below the lines for µ = 0.3 and detection efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid black line), 0.5
(large dashed magenta line), 0.4 (dot dashed blue line), 0.3 (dotted green line), 0.2 (dashed red line).
To gain further intuition into the role that the different parameters play in determining the rate λ, we investigate
the trade-off between λ and the detection efficiency η in Figure 14, and the trade-off between λ and the mean photon
number µ in Figure 15 for some choices of storage noise r and storage rate ν.
b. 1-2 oblivious transfer We can now consider the security of (ℓ, ε)-oblivious transfer based on weak string erasure
implemented using a weak coherent source. The parameter which is of most concern to us here is the bit error rate
perr = p
h
B,err/(1 − phB,no click). As we already saw in Figure 8, this error cannot be arbitrarily large for a fixed value
of the WSE rate λ. In a practical implementation, this translates into a trade-off between the bit error perr and the
efficiency η as shown in Figure 16, where for now we treat perr as an independent parameter to get an intuition for
its contribution.
Of course perr is not an independent parameter, but depends on µ, η and most crucially on edet. Figure 17 shows
how many bits ℓ of 1-2 oblivious transfer we can hope to obtain per valid pulse M for very large M . The parameter
µ has thereby been chosen to obtain a high rate when all other parameters were fixed. We will also refer to ℓ/M as
the oblivious transfer rate. As expected, we can see that this rate does of course depend greatly on the efficiency η,
but also on the storage noise and on the storage rate.
3. Parameters using decoy states
We now analyze the scenario where Alice sends decoy states. In particular, let us consider a simple system with
only two decoy states: vacuum and a weak decoy state with mean photon number µˆ. The mean photon number of
the signal states will be denoted as µ. Moreover, we select µˆ < µ. Without loss of generality, we hence use labels
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FIG. 13: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the amount of depolarizing noise r where µ = 0.3, and a variety of detection
efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid black line), 0.6 (dashed red line), 0.5 (dotted blue line), 0.4 (dot dashed yellow line), 0.3 (large dashed
magenta line) and 0.2 (larger dashed turquoise line).
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FIG. 14: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the
detection efficiency η for r = 0.8 and storage rates ν: 1/5
(solid blue line), 1/4 (dashed red line), 1/2 (dotted green
line), 2/3 (dot dashed magenta line).
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FIG. 15: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the
mean photon number µ for r = 0.8 and ν as in Figure 14.
S = {vac, µˆ, µ} for the possible settings of the source. Furthermore, we assume that Alice chooses one of these settings
uniformly at random, that is PS(s) = 1/3 for all s ∈ S. This may not be optimal, but due to the large number of
parameters we will limit ourselves to this choice. Since pnsrc = p
n
sent for the case of a phase-randomized weak coherent
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FIG. 16: (Color online) Security for (perr, η) in the shaded region for example parameters r = 0.4, ν = 1/5 and large ω = 100000.
21
100 000 100 005 100 010 100 015 100 020
M
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
lM
FIG. 17: (Color online) The rate ℓ/M of oblivious transfer for a large number of valid pulses M for parameters ω = 1000 and
(µ = 0.15, η = 0.3, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, solid blue line), (µ = 0.4, η = 0.7, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, dashed red line), (µ = 0.15, η = 0.7,
r = 0.7, ν = 1/4, dotted magenta line), (µ = 0.2, η = 0.7, r = 0.4, ν = 1/3, light blue line).
source, we can write for honest Bob
Qhvac = p
h|0
B,click , (26)
Qhµˆ = e
−µˆ
∞∑
n=0
µˆn
n!
p
h|n
B,click , (27)
Qhµ = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
p
h|n
B,click . (28)
(29)
For the typical channel model, that is, if Bob were honest, we furthermore have
p
h|0
B,click = 2pdark(1 − pdark) + p2dark , (30)
p
h|n
B,click = 1− (1 − ph|0B,click)(1 − η)n . (31)
(32)
For simplicity, when calculating the value of the parameter p
h|0
B,click we have only considered the noise arising from
dark counts in the detectors. In a practical situation, however, there might be other effects like stray light that also
contribute to the final value of p
h|0
B,click. Still, from her knowledge of the experimental setup, Alice can always make a
reasonable estimate of the maximum tolerable value of p
h|0
B,click such that the protocol is not aborted and the analysis is
completely analogous. Furthermore, we have assumed that the losses come mainly from the finite detection efficiency
of the detectors, since the communication distance will be typically quite short.
To estimate a lower bound on the yield of single photons we follow the procedure proposed in [24]. Note, however,
that many other estimation techniques are also available, like, for instance, linear programming tools [32]. In the
asymptotic case we obtain [24]
(1− r(1)) ≥ τˆ with τˆ := µ
µµˆ− µˆ2
(
Qhµˆe
µˆ −Qhµeµ
µˆ2
µ2
− µ
2 − µˆ2
µ2
Qhvac
)
, (33)
where we used the fact that for honest Bob p
h|1
B,click = 1 − r(1) in the limit of large M , as Bob will decide to report
any round as missing that he did not receive. In Protocol 2 we have that conditioned on the event that Alice does
not abort the protocol
Qmeasvac ∈ [(Qhvac − ζ0), (Qhvac + ζ0)] , (34)
Qmeasµˆ ∈ [(Qhµˆ − ζµˆ), (Qhµˆ + ζµˆ)] , (35)
Qmeasµ ∈ [(Qhµ − ζµ), (Qhµ + ζµ)] , (36)
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where ζ0 =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2M0), ζµˆ =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2Mµˆ) , and ζµ =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2Mµ). We can hence bound
(1− r(1)) ≥ τ with τ := µ
µµˆ− µˆ2
(
(Qhµˆ − 2ζµˆ)eµˆ − (Qhµ + 2ζµ)eµ
µˆ2
µ2
− µ
2 − µˆ2
µ2
(Qhvac + 2ζ0)
)
, (37)
which in the limit of large M0, Mµ and Mµˆ gives us (33). The factor 2 in the equation (37) above stems from the
fact that Alice still accepts a value at the upper (or lower) edge of the interval such as Qhµ + ζµ. In this case however,
the real parameter Qˆhµ is possibly as high as Q
h
µ + 2ζµ.
4. Weak string erasure
For direct comparison, we now provide the same plots as given in Section VA2a, where for simplicity we will
always choose µˆ = 0.05. Of course, this may not be optimal, but serves as a good comparison. As expected using
decoy states limits dishonest Bob from reporting too many single-photon rounds as missing, thereby allowing us to
place a better bound on r(1). This fact greatly increases the range of parameters η and µ for which we can hope to
show security as shown in Figures 18 and 19. We also observe in Figure 20 that the detection efficiency η plays almost
no role in determining for which values of storage noise r and storage rate ν we can obtain security. This is true for
all values of µ ≤ 0.4 we have chosen to examine.
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FIG. 18: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) with
decoy states in the shaded region where (12) is fulfilled.
Additional conditions such as (13) are checked in the fol-
lowing Figure 19.
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FIG. 19: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) with
decoy states in the upper enclosed regions for a low stor-
age noise of r = 0.9 and storage rates 1/2 (dashed red
line), 0.45 (dotted green line), 0.35 (dot dashed blue line),
0.25 (large dashed magenta line), 0.15 (solid black line).
(satisfying (12) and (13)).
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FIG. 20: (Color online) Security for (r, ν) with decoy states below the lines for µ = 0.3 and detection efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid
black line), 0.5 (large dashed magenta line), 0.4 (dot dashed blue line), 0.3 (dotted green line), 0.2 (dashed red line).
It is however interesting to observe that the magnitude of the final weak string erasure rate λ changes only slightly
when we use decoy states. This is due to the strong converse parameter (15) which determines λ as given in (16)
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and which is not necessarily large for larger values of R. This is witnessed by Figure 21. Still, we again observe that
we may use much lower values of η as shown in Figure 22 and a much higher mean photon number µ as shown in
Figure 23.
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FIG. 21: (Color online) The WSE rate λ for decoy states in terms of the amount of depolarizing noise r where µ = 0.3, and
a variety of detection efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid black line), 0.6 (dashed red line), 0.5 (dotted blue line), 0.4 (dot dashed yellow
line), 0.3 (large dashed magenta line) and 0.2 (larger dashed turquoise line).
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FIG. 22: (Color online) The WSE rate λ for decoy states
in terms of the detection efficiency η for r = 0.8 and
storage rates ν: 1/5 (solid blue line), 1/4 (dashed red
line).
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FIG. 23: (Color online) The WSE rate λ for decoy states
in terms of the mean photon number µ for r = 0.8 and ν
as in Figure 22
.
5. 1-2 oblivious transfer
Again, we also consider the security of (ℓ, ε)-oblivious transfer based on weak string erasure implemented using a
weak coherent source and decoy states as above. We first observe that decoy states soften the trade-off between the
bit error perr and the efficiency η as shown in Figure 24, where we for now treat perr as an independent parameter to
get an intuition for its contribution. Figure 25 now shows how many bits ℓ of 1-2 oblivious transfer we can hope to
obtain per valid pulse M for very largeM , when using decoy states. Again, we see that using decoy states softens the
effects of η. Note that we again count only the valid pulses, which here corresponds to all pulses sent with the signal
setting. As in QKD, it may be possible to use the remaining pulses which one could incorporate in our analysis given
in the appendix. However, for clarity of exposition, we have chosen not to make use of such pulses in this work.
B. Parametric down-conversion source
1. Experimental setup and loss model
Now we consider that Alice uses a pumped type-II PDC source. The states emitted by this type of source can be
written as [33]
|Ψsrc〉AB =
∞∑
n=0
√
pnsrc|Φn〉AB, (38)
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FIG. 24: (Color online) Security for (perr, η) with decoy states in the shaded region for example parameters r = 0.4, ν = 1/5
and large ω = 100000.
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FIG. 25: (Color online) The rate ℓ/M of oblivious transfer with decoy states for a large number of valid pulsesM for parameters
ω = 1000 and (µ = 0.2, η = 0.3, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, solid blue line), (µ = 0.3,η = 0.7, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, dashed red line),
(µ = 0.3, η = 0.7, r = 0.7, ν = 1/4, dotted magenta line), (µ = 0.3, η = 0.7, r = 0.4, ν = 1/3, light blue line).
where the probability distribution pnsrc is given by
pnsrc =
(n+ 1)(µ/2)n
(1 + (µ/2))n+2
. (39)
The parameter µ/2 is directly related to the pump amplitude of the laser resulting in a mean photon pair number
per pulse of µ, and
|Φn〉AB =
n∑
m=0
(−1)m√
n+ 1
|n−m,m〉A|m,n−m〉B. (40)
Here we have used the computational basis on each side. Each signal state |Φn〉AB contains exactly 2n photons; n of
them are measured by Alice and the other n are measured by Bob, as depicted in Figure 26. We furthermore choose
η as in the case of a weak coherent source. That is, since ηAηchannelηB = 1 we simply write η = ηD for both parties.
The dark count rate is again denoted by pdark.
An important difference between the setup using a PDC source and the one using a weak coherent pulse source, is
that Alice herself can (with some probability) discard a round if she concludes no photon—or too many photons—have
been emitted. These rounds can be safely discarded by herself, and thus do not contribute to the protocol any further.
We will refer to the remaining pulses as valid. To compare the two approaches more easily, we will assume that in the
case of a PDC source, we consider only the valid pulses. That is, the parameter M in the WSE protocol corresponds
to the valid pulses, and not to all pulses emitted by Alice. It is certainly debatable whether this is a fair comparison,
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FIG. 26: Experimental setup with a PDC source. Alice and Bob measure each output signal by means of an active BB84
measurement setup, like the one described in Section VA1.
Parameter Value
p1src µ/(1 + (µ/2))
3
p1sent (C21)
p
h|1
B,click η + (1− η)pdark(2− pdark)
pd,nB,err (C27)
pdB,no click p
0
sent, see (C21)
phB,S,no click (C23)
phB,no click p
h
B,S,no click − p
h
B,S,no clickpdark(2− pdark)
pB,D,err pdark(1− pdark) + p
2
dark/2
pB,DS,err (C26)
phB,S,err (C24)
phB,err p
h
B,S,err(1− pdark(2− pdark)) + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,err + pB,DS,err
TABLE II: Summary of probabilities for parametric down-conversion source
but since M is the parameter which is relevant to the security of the protocol, we choose to consider the final rates
as a function of M .
The setting of a PDC source is slightly more difficult to analyze, but can lead to better rates ℓ/M than those
arising from a weak coherent source, where, like before, ℓ is the number of bits of oblivious transfer we obtain and
M is the number of valid pulses. The reason for this improvement is two-fold: First, from her measurement results,
Alice can (with some probability) estimate how many photons have been emitted each given time. This means that
we are no longer restricted to tuning the source such that the number of multi-photon emissions is too low, but can
permit for a larger variation by relying on Alice to filter out the unwanted events. Second, a multi-photon emission
does not provide dishonest Bob with full information about the signal state sent by Alice. In this scenario we need to
consider the probability of success for dishonest Bob when a certain number of photons have been emitted which is
given by Claim C.1 in the appendix. Table II again summarizes the probabilities we need to know in order to evaluate
security. Since some expressions can be rather unwieldy for the case of a PDC source, we will sometimes refer to the
corresponding equation in the appendix.
2. Security parameters
a. Weak string erasure We now investigate the security of (m,λ, ε, perr)-weak string erasure, when using a PDC
source. For easy comparison, we will consider exactly the same plots as before, where however we sometimes choose
a different value for the mean photon number which seemed more useful for this source. For simplicity, we will also
consider a setting where we give all the information encoded in multi-photons to dishonest Bob for free, i.e., we
consider pd,nB,err = 0, which clearly overestimates his capabilities as we see in Claim C.1. Again, we first consider when
security can be obtained in principle (i.e., when (12) and (13) are satisfied) as a function of the mean photon number
µ, the detection efficiency η, the storage rate ν and the amount of storage noise, where our examples here focus on the
depolarizing channel with parameter r as defined in (11). Figure 27 thereby tells us again when security is possible
at all, independently of the amount of storage noise. As before, we then examine a particular example of storage
noise and storage rates in Figure 28, that even for low storage noise, we can hope to achieve security for many source
settings.
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FIG. 27: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) in the
shaded region where (12) is fulfilled. Our proof does not
apply to parameters in the region below the curve. For
the shaded region above the curve, additional conditions
such as (13) are checked in the following Figure 28.
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FIG. 28: (Color online) Security possible for (η, µ) in the
upper enclosed regions for a low storage noise of r = 0.9
and storage rates 1/2 (dashed red line), 0.45 (dotted
green line), 0.35 (dot dashed blue line), 0.25 (large dashed
magenta line), 0.15 (solid black line). (satisfying (12)
and (13)).
Second, we consider again when conditions (12) and (13) can be satisfied in terms of the amount of noise in storage
given by r, and the storage rate ν for some typical parameters in an experimental setup in Figure 29. It is interesting
to note that the efficiency η plays a much more prominent role when using a PDC source. This comes from the fact
that Alice herself also uses a detector of efficiency η to post-select some of the pulses.
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FIG. 29: (Color online) Security for (r, ν) below the lines for µ = 0.3 and detection efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid black line), 0.5
(large dashed magenta line), 0.4 (dot dashed blue line), 0.3 (dotted green line), 0.2 (dashed red line).
Yet, we conclude that secure weak string erasure can be obtained for a reasonable choice of parameters, so it remains
to establish the weak string erasure rate λ by solving the optimization problem given by (16). Figure 30 gives us λ
for various choices of experimental settings, and a storage rate of ν = 1. This demonstrates that even for a very high
storage rate, there is a positive rate of λ for many reasonable settings.
The trade-off between λ and the detection efficiency η given in Figure 31 is quite similar to what we observed in
the case of a weak coherent source. On the other hand, the trade-off between λ and the mean photon number µ in
Figure 32 shows that having a low mean photon number seems more significant. Recall, however, that we have for
simplicity assumed that we give all multi-photons to Bob for free which greatly overestimates his capabilities when
using a PDC source. These parameters could thus be improved when including multi-photons.
b. 1-2 oblivious transfer We can now consider the security of (ℓ, ε)-oblivious transfer based on weak string erasure
implemented using a PDC source. In Figure 33, we first examine the trade-off between an independently chosen bit
error rate perr and the efficiency η, which is similar to what we observe for the case of a weak coherent source.
Figure 34 now shows how many bits ℓ of 1-2 oblivious transfer we can hope to obtain per valid pulse M for very
large M . This is much higher than what we observe for the case of a weak coherent source, but note that in all plots
we only consider the valid pulses M . For a weak coherent source, this is equal to the actual number of pulses emitted
as Alice does not post-select. However, for the case of a PDC source, Alice can (with some probability) discard
rounds in which no photon has been emitted. This comparison is arguably unfair, but since M is the parameter that
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FIG. 30: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the amount of depolarizing noise r where µ = 0.3, and a variety of detection
efficiencies η: 0.7 (solid black line), 0.6 (dashed red line), 0.5 (dotted blue line), 0.4 (dot dashed yellow line), 0.3 (large dashed
magenta line) and 0.2 (larger dashed turquoise line).
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FIG. 31: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the
detection efficiency η for r = 0.8 and storage rates ν: 1/5
(solid blue line), 1/4 (dashed red line), 1/2 (dotted green
line), 2/3 (dot dashed magenta line).
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FIG. 32: (Color online) The WSE rate λ in terms of the
mean photon number µ for r = 0.8 and ν as in Figure 31.
is relevant to the security of our protocol, we chose to use the number of valid pulses, instead of the number of all
pulses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have shown that security in the noisy-storage model [8, 10] can in principle be obtained in a practical setting,
and provided explicit security parameters for two possible experimental setups. Our analysis shows that the protocols
of [10] are well within reach of today’s technology.
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FIG. 33: (Color online) Security for (perr, η) in the shaded region for example parameters r = 0.4, ν = 1/5 and large ω = 100000.
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FIG. 34: (Color online) The rate ℓ/M of oblivious transfer for a large number of valid pulses M for parameters µ = 0.05,
ω = 1000 and (η = 0.3, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, solid blue line), (η = 0.7, r = 0.1, ν = 1/10, dashed red line), (η = 0.7, r = 0.7,
ν = 1/4, dotted magenta line), (η = 0.7, r = 0.4, ν = 1/3, light blue line)
. Note that the scaling of this plot is different than for the WCP source with and without decoy states.
We have been mostly focusing our attention on short-distance (in the order of a few meters) applications. For this
range, it is an interesting experimental challenge to construct small handheld devices which can be used to implement
these protocols. Nonetheless, in the future it might be interesting to study the curve between the rate and the distance
of secure WSEE (in a similar way as the key rate versus distance curve in QKD). Such a curve will allow us to see
if our protocols can be applied in a local area network (LAN) or metropolitan area network (MAN). Note that for
medium-distance (say order 10km) applications, our protocol may still work. For instance, standard telecom fiber has
a channel loss of about 0.2dB/km at telecom wavelength (i.e. 1550nm) So, 10km translates to only 2dB channel loss,
which seems quite manageable!
Many important theoretical (see [10]) as well as practical issues remain to be addressed. As in quantum key
distribution (QKD), we have assumed that all experimental components behave as we expect them to. Hence, we
have not considered any practical attacks such as exploiting detectors that are blind above a certain threshold [34],
which is outside the scope of this work. Most importantly however, it is certaintly possible to improve the parameters
obtained here. These improvements can come from theoretical advances [10], as well as an exact optimization of all
parameters for a particular experimental setup. Furthermore, in the case of parametric down conversion, for example,
we have not made use of the fact that Bob cannot gain full information from multi-photon emissions, which leads to
an increase in rates. Similarly, when using decoy states, one could make use of pulses emitted using a decoy setting
in the protocol. This requires a careful analysis of weak string erasure for different photon sources analogous to the
one presented in the appendix. Nevertheless, we hope that this analysis paves the way for a practical implementation
of protocols in the noisy-storage model.
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Appendix A: Proof of security: WSEE
Here we show how the security proof of [10] can be modified to apply in the practical settings considered in this
paper. To this end, we first provide a more formal definition of WSEE.
Definition A.1. An (m,λ, ε, perr)-weak string erasure protocol with errors (WSEE) is a protocol between Alice and
Bob satisfying the following properties, where Eperr is defined as in (5):
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then the ideal state σXmIEperr (XI) is defined such that
1. The joint distribution of the m-bit string Xm and subset I is uniform:
σXmI = τ{0,1}m ⊗ τ2[m] , (A1)
2. The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
ρAB ≈ε σXmIEperr(XI) . (A2)
where we identify (A,B) with (Xm, IEperr(XI)).
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then there exists an ideal state σXmB′ such that
1. The amount of information B′ gives Bob about Xm is limited:
1
m
H∞(X
m|B′)σ ≥ λ (A3)
2. The joint state ρAB′ created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
σXmB′ ≈ε ρAB′ (A4)
where we identify (Xm, B′) with (A,B′).
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists an ideal state σA′X̂mI , where X̂
m ∈ {0, 1}m and I ⊆ [m] such
that
1. The random variable I is independent of A′X̂m and uniformly distributed over 2[m]:
σA′X̂mI = σA′X̂m ⊗ τ2[m] . (A5)
2. The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
ρA′B ≈ε σA′IEperr(X̂I) (A6)
where we identify (A′, B) with (A′, IEperr(X̂I)).
We study Protocol 1, i.e., without the use of decoy states. The case of decoy states is analogous, where we obtain
a different bound in (A19), as discussed in Section III B. The analysis is essentially the same in both cases, only we
bound certain parameters in a different way. The general security evaluation of correctness and the case when Bob is
honest follows the same arguments as in [10]. It is clear by construction that an honest Bob reports enough rounds so
that Alice does not abort except with probability ε and hence the real output states are at most ε-far from the ideal
states.
From now on we concentrate on the situation where Alice is honest, but Bob might try to cheat. Our analysis
contains two steps. We first consider single-photon emissions, which we analyze as in [10], taking into account that
Bob may report some additional single-photon rounds as missing. Second, we consider multi-photon rounds. The
main difficulty arises from the fact that Bob may report up to
Mdmax = (p
h
B,no click + ζ
h
B,no click)M (A7)
of the M rounds as missing, where he himself can choose which rounds to report. First of all, note that we can
assume that even a dishonest Bob always reports a round as missing if he receives a vacuum state. By the same
arguments as in Section II we have that the number of rounds where Bob observes no click lies in the interval
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[(pdB,no click − ζdB,no click)M, (pdB,no click + ζdB,no click)M ] for ζdB,no click =
√
ln(2/ε)/(2M), except with probability ε.
Here, we make a worst-case assumption that the number of rounds where dishonest Bob observes no click is given by
Mdnc = (p
d
B,no click − ζdB,no click)M , (A8)
and he can thus report up to
Mdreport =M
d
max −Mdnc = (phB,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click)M , (A9)
rounds of his choice to be missing. Let M (n) denote the number of rounds corresponding to an n-photon emission,
let r(n) denote the fraction of n photon rounds that dishonest Bob chooses to report as missing, and let M
(n)
left =
(1− r(n))M (n) denote the number of n photon rounds that dishonest Bob has left. Note that in the limit of large M
we have M (n) = pnsentM . Clearly, we must have that
∞∑
n=1
r(n)M (n) ≤Mdreport , (A10)
or Alice will abort the protocol.
1. Single-photon emissions
Single photons are desirable, since they correspond to the idealized setting analyzed in [10] where Alice does indeed
send BB84 states. Clearly, in the limit of large M , we expect roughly p1sentM single-photon rounds. However, since
Bob may choose to report single-photon rounds as missing, we have to analyze how many rounds still contribute to
our security analysis. The analysis of [10] links the security to the rate at which Bob has to send classical information
through his noisy storage channel. In order to determine this rate, we first investigate the setting where he is not
allowed to keep any quantum state.
Let X(1) denote the substring of XM that corresponds to single-photon emissions. In [10] the rate at which
Bob needs to send information through his noisy-storage channel depends on an uncertainty relation using post-
measurement information. This uncertainty relation provides a bound on the min-entropy that Bob has about X(1)
given a classical measurement outcome K, and the basis information he obtains later on. We are thus interested in
the min-entropy
H∞(X
(1)|K(1)Θ(1))ρ = − logPguess(X(1)|K(1)Θ(1)) , (A11)
where we use K(1) and Θ(1) to denote Bob’s classical information and the basis information corresponding to the
single-photon rounds respectively and Pguess is the probability that Bob guesses the string X
(1) maximized over all
choices of measurements anticipating his post-measurement information Θ(1) [41]. Important for us is the fact that
since Alice picks one of the four BB84 encodings uniformly at random in each time slot, the initial state
ρX(1)Q(1)Θ(1) =
M(1)⊗
j=1
ρ
X
(1)
j
Q
(1)
j
Θ
(1)
j
, (A12)
has tensor-product form, and it follows from [41] together with [8] that also the state
ρX(1)K(1)Θ(1) =
M(1)⊗
j=1
ρ
X
(1)
j
K
(1)
j
Θ
(1)
j
, (A13)
is a tensor product, that is, Bob’s best strategy to guess X(1) purely with the help of classical information K(1) has
tensor-product form. It is important to note that this does not mean that Bob does indeed perform a tensor-product
attack in general. It merely states that with respect to the uncertainty he has about X(1) given only his classical
information and the basis information if he kept no quantum computation, his best attack would be a tensor-product
attack. And hence for any other classical information that he may obtain from his actual attack in the protocol, this
uncertainty is only going to be greater.
We can now use the fact that the min-entropy of a tensor-product state is additive [8], to conclude that the min-
entropy that Bob has about X(1) given K(1) and Θ(1) is thus a min-entropy per bit, which allows us to compute the
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remaining min-entropy if Bob reports some of the single-photon rounds as missing. More precisely, if X
(1)
left is the
substring of XM corresponding to the single-photon rounds that Bob does not report as missing, we know from the
uncertainty relation of [12] and a purification argument that
Hεˆ∞(X
(1)
left|K(1)leftΘ(1)left) ≥
(
1
2
− 2δ
)
M
(1)
left , (A14)
where K
(1)
left and Θ
(1)
left correspond to the classical and basis information respectively for the remaining single-photon
rounds, and
εˆ = exp
(
− δ
2M
(1)
left
32(2 + log 1δ )
2
)
. (A15)
To determine the security as a whole, we of course need to take into account that dishonest Bob also holds some
quantum information about X
(1)
left, besides his classical information. We adopt the notation of [10] and write
ρ
X
(1)
leftΘ
(1)
leftK
(1)F(Qin)
=
1
(2|M
(1)
left|)2
∑
x, θ
k∈K
PK|X=x,Θ=θ(k) |x〉〈x|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ |θ〉〈θ| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ F(ζxθk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob B(1)
, (A16)
where Bob holds B(1) = Θ
(1)
leftK
(1)F(Qin), and ζxθk ∈ B(Qin) is the state entering Bob’s quantum storage when Alice
chose x and θ, and Bob already extracted some classical information k. Here, K(1) includes all of Bob’s classical
information, and depending on Bob’s attack may not have tensor-product form. Nevertheless, we know from [10]
that (A14) tells us at which rate cheating Bob has to send information through his storage channel F for any attack
he conceives.
a. General storage noise
In particular, we can now make use of the uncertainty relation (A14) together with the analysis of [10, Lemma 2.2
and Theorem 3.3] to obtain that for single-photon rounds we have that for any attack of dishonest Bob
Hε∞(X
(1)
left|Θ(1)leftK(1)leftF(Q(1))) ≥ − logPFsucc
((
1
2
− δ
)
M
(1)
left
)
, (A17)
for
ε = 2 exp
(
− (δ/4)
2
32(2 + log(4/δ))2
·M (1)left
)
. (A18)
Note that we have from (A10) that
r(1) ≤ min
[
phB,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click
p1sent − ζ1sent
, 1
]
, (A19)
and hence
M
(1)
left = (1− r(1))M (1) (A20)
≥M
(
1− p
h
B,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click
p1sent − ζ1sent
)
(p1sent − ζhsent) , (A21)
which in the limit of large M gives us
M
(1)
left ≥M(p1sent + pdB,no click − phB,no click) . (A22)
Since r(1) is chosen by dishonest Bob and hence is unknown to Alice, we bound ε for any strategy of dishonest Bob as
ε ≤ 2 exp
{
− (δ/4)
2
32(2 + log(4/δ))2
·
[
1−
(
phB,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click
p1sent − ζ1sent
)]
(p1sent − ζhsent)M
}
.
(A23)
In the case of decoy states, we just obtain a better bound in (A19), where the remaining security analysis is analogous.
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b. Tensor-product channels
Of particular interest is the case where Bob’s storage noise is of the form F = N⊗νMstore where ν is the storage rate,
Mstore is the number of bits we count to determine Bob’s storage, and N obeys the strong converse property [19].
As outlined earlier, we assume that the number of qubits that determines Bob’s storage size is as in the idealistic
setting of [10] given by the number of single-photon emissions that we expect an honest Bob to receive for large M ,
i.e., Mstore.
From the strong converse property of N follows that
− logPN⊗νMstoresucc (MstoreR) ≥ ν · γN (R/ν)Mstore , (A24)
where γN (R/ν) > 0 for CN · ν < R and CN is the classical capacity of the channel N [19]. To achieve security in this
setting we hence want to determine R such that(
1
2
− δ
)
M
(1)
left = R ·Mstore , (A25)
which gives us
R =
(
1
2
− δ
)
(1− r(1))(p1sent − ζ1sent)
p1sent · ph|1B,click
for p
h|1
B,click > 0 , (A26)
and R = 0 otherwise, which for large M becomes
R =
(
1
2
− δ
)
1− r(1)
p
h|1
B,click
. (A27)
Whenever p
h|1
B,click > 0, note that R can be significantly larger than 1/2 due the difference between M
(1) and Mstore.
We can now use (A19) to bound R as
R ≥
(
1
2
− δ
)
max
[
0,
1
p
h|1
B,click
− p
h
B,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click
p1sent · ph|1B,click
]
, (A28)
which for large M is just
R ≥
(
1
2
− δ
)
max
[
0,
p1sent − phB,no click + pdB,no click
p1sent · ph|1B,click
]
. (A29)
Summarizing, we have that for any strategy of dishonest Bob
Hε∞(X
(1)
left|Θ(1)leftK(1)leftF(Q(1))) ≥ ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
Mstore . (A30)
2. Multi-photon emissions
It remains to address the case of multi-photon emissions. We analyze here a conservative scenario where dishonest
Bob obtains the basis information for free whenever a multi-photon emission occurred. This situation can only make
dishonest Bob more powerful. Note that this also means that Bob will never attempt to store such emissions, since
he will never obtain more information about them as he already has. We thus assume that Bob keeps no quantum
knowledge about the rounds corresponding to multi-photon emissions. We will see below that for the case of a PDC
source, Bob nevertheless does not obtain full information about a bit in the case of a multi-photon emission.
For an n-photon emission, the probability that Bob performs a correct decoding is given by (1− pd,nB,err). If bit j of
XM was generated by an N = n-photon emission, we thus have
H∞(Xj |ΘjKj N = n) = − log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)
. (A31)
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Since we assume that Bob keeps no quantum information about the multi-photon rounds we may write his state
corresponding to the rounds in which n > 1 photons have been emitted as
ρ
X
(n)
leftB
(n) =
⊗
j
ρ
X
(n)
left,jB
(n)
j
, (A32)
where B
(n)
j is a classical register. Using the fact that the min-entropy is additive for a tensor-product state [8], we
have that Bob’s min-entropy about the substring X(n) of XM (belonging to N = n photon emissions that Bob does
not report as missing) is given by
1
M
(n)
left
H∞(X
(n)
left |Θ(n)leftK(n)leftN = n) = − log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)
. (A33)
3. Putting things together
Let Xm be the substring of bits of XM that Bob does not report as missing. In order to determine the overall
security parameters, we need to determine how much min-entropy dishonest Bob has about
Xm =
∞⋃
n=1
X
(n)
left . (A34)
Since we assume that Bob keeps no quantum information about the multi-photon rounds we may write the state of
the system if Bob is dishonest as
ρXmB′ ≃
∞⊗
n=1
ρ
X
(n)
leftB
(n) , (A35)
where B(n) contains a copy of all classical information available to Bob, and where we have reordered the systems
into parts belonging to different photon number n. The following theorem comes from [10, Theorem 3.3], together
with the discussion given above.
Theorem A.2 (Security against Bob). Fix δ ∈]0, 12 [ and let
ε = 2 exp
(
− (δ/4)
2
32(2 + log(4/δ))2
·M (1)left
)
. (A36)
Then for any attack of a dishonest Bob with storage F : B(Hin)→ B(Hout), there exists a cq-state σXmB′ such that
1. σXmB′ ≈2ε ρXmB′ ,
2. 1m H∞(X
m|B)σ ≥ − 1m
[
logPFsucc(R ·Mstore) +
∑∞
n=2M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
,
where ρXmB′ is given by (A35).
Proof. Let σ
X
(1)
leftB
(1) be defined as in the analysis of single-photon emissions in [10]. Following the same arguments as
in [10] and adding another ε for the probability that the number of rounds in which Bob observes no click lies outside
the interval [(pdB,no click−ζdB,no click)M, (pdB,no click+ζdB,no click)M ], we get 12‖ρX(1)
left
B(1)
−σ
X
(1)
left
B(1)
‖1 ≤ 2ε. Furthermore,
let σ
X
(n)
left
B(n)
= ρ
X
(n)
left
B(n)
for n > 1 and let
σXmB′ =
∞⊗
n=1
σ
X
(n)
leftB
(n) . (A37)
Note that by the subadditivity of the trace distance, we have
1
2
‖ρXmB′ − σXmB′‖1 ≤ 2ε . (A38)
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It remains to show that σXmB′ has high min-entropy. Note that
H∞(X
m|B)σ = H∞(X(1)left|B(1))σ +
∞∑
n=2
H∞(X
(n)
left |B(n))σ , (A39)
where we have used the additivity of the min-entropy for tensor-product states [8], and that conditioning on indepen-
dent information does not change the min-entropy. Our claim now follows immediately from Sections A 1 and A2.
We can again specialize this result to the case of tensor-product channels.
Corollary A.3 (Security against Bob). Let Bob’s storage be described by F = N⊗νMstore with ν > 0, N satisfying
the strong converse property [19], and
CN · ν < min
r(1)
R , (A40)
where R is defined in (A26). Fix δ ∈]0,minr(1) R − CN · ν[. Then, for any attack of dishonest Bob there exists a
cq-state σXmB′ such that
1. σXmB′ ≈2ε ρXmB′ ,
2. 1m H∞(X
m|B′)σ ≥ 1m
[
Mstoreν · γN (R/ν)−
∑∞
n=2M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
,
with ρXnB′ and ε given by (A35) and (A36) respectively.
Our main theorem now follows by allowing Bob to choose {r(n)} minimizing his total min-entropy. To be able
to give an exact security guarantee we bound the parameter ε which may depend on dishonest Bob’s choice of r(1)
using (A23).
Theorem A.4 (Weak string erasure). Protocol 1 is an (m,λ(δ), ε(δ), phB,err)-weak string erasure protocol for the
following two settings:
1. Let Bob’s storage be given by F : B(Hin)→ B(Hout), and let δ ∈]0, 12 [. Then we obtain a min-entropy rate
λ(δ) = min
{r(n)}n
lim
m→∞
1
m
[
− logPFsucc (R ·Mstore)−
∞∑
n=2
M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
, (A41)
(A42)
where the minimization is taken over all {r(n)}n such that
∑∞
n=1 r
(n)M (n) ≤Mdreport and
m =
∞∑
n=1
M
(n)
left , Mstore = p
1
sent · ph|1B,clickM (A43)
R =
(
1
2
− δ
)
1− r(1)
p
h|1
B,click
, (A44)
and error
ε(δ) ≤ 4 exp
(
− δ
2
512(4 + log 1δ )
2
·
(
p1sent −
(
p1sent(p
h
B,no click − pdB,no click + ζhB,no click + ζdB,no click)
p1sent − ζ1sent
))
M
)
.
(A45)
2. Suppose F = N⊗νMstore for a storage rate ν > 0, N satisfying the strong converse property [19] and having
capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν < min
r(1)
R . (A46)
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then we obtain a min-entropy rate of
λ˜(δ) = min
{r(n)}n
1
m
[
ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
Mstore −
∞∑
n=2
M
(n)
left log
(
1− pd,nB,err
)]
, (A47)
for sufficiently large M .
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Appendix B: Proof of security: FROT from WSEE
We show that our augmented protocol implements fully randomized oblivious transfer, as defined in [10]. The proofs
of correctness and security for honest Bob are analogous to the ones given in [10], using the fact that the properties of
the error-correcting code ensure that Bob obtains SC except with probability ε. Furthermore, note that a dishonest
Alice cannot gain any information about C from a one-way error-correction scheme. We therefore concentrate on
proving security for an honest Alice when Bob is dishonest. The proof proceeds as in [10], except for a small variation
which we state below.
Lemma B.1 (Security for Alice). Let ℓ :=
⌊((
ω−1
ω
)
λ
8 − λ
2
512ω2β − 1.2·h(perr)8
)
m− 12
⌋
. Then, Protocol WSEE-to-
FROT satisfies security for Alice with an error of
41 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
m
+ 2ε .
Proof. We know from the analysis in [10] that
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(Z)Enc(W t1−C)|SℓCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′,A)σ˜ ≥
(
ω − 1
ω
)
λm
4
− ℓ− 1 , (B1)
where B′′′ is the system of dishonest Bob after the interactive hashing protocol and A is the event that the inter-
active hashing protocol provides us with a set W t1−C of high min-entropy. A has probability Pr[A] ≥ 1 − 32δ2,
where δ = 2−αλ
2/(512ω2). Here, Bob has some additional information given by the syndromes Syn(Π(Z)j) of
the blocks j ∈ Enc(W t0) ∪ Enc(W t1). Let us denote the total of this error-correcting information by Syn :=
{Syn(Π(Z)j)}j∈Enc(W t0 )∪Enc(W t1). Notice that even if the encodings overlap in some blocks, only the syndromes of
the α/4 blocks in Enc(W t1−C) lower Bob’s min-entropy on Π(Z)Enc(W t1−C). We can hence bound
Hε+4δ∞ (Π(Z)Enc(W t1−C)|SℓCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠSynB′′′,A)σ˜ (B2)
≥ Hε+4δ∞ (Π(Z)Enc(W t1−C)|SℓCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠB′′′,A)σ˜ − 1.2 · h(perr)
m
4
(B3)
≥
((
ω − 1
ω
)
λ
4
− 1.2 · h(perr)
4
)
m− ℓ− 1 , (B4)
where the first inequality follows from the chain rule, the monotonicity of the smooth min-entropy [29], and the fact
that error-correction information needs to be send for β · α/4 = m/4 bits. Using privacy amplification [29], we then
have that, conditioned on the event A,
1
2
‖σ˜S1−C ,SCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠSynB′′′ − τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σ˜SCCR0R1W t0W t1ΠSynB′′′‖1 ≤ δ + 2ε+ 8δ , (B5)
since (
ω − 1
ω
)
λm
4
− 1.2 · h(perr)m
4
− 2ℓ− 1 ≥ 2 log 1/δ = 2 · λ
2α
512ω2
,
which follows from
ℓ ≤
((
ω − 1
ω
)
λ
8
− 1.2 · h(perr)
8
)
m− λ
2α
512ω2
− 1
2
.
Let B∗ := (R0R1W
t
0W
t
1ΠSynB
′′′) be Bob’s part in the output state. Since Pr[A] ≥ 1− 32δ2, we get
σ˜S1−CSCB∗C ≈32δ2+9δ+2ε τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σ˜SCB∗C
and
σ˜S0S1B∗ = ρ˜S0S1B∗ .
Since δ2 ≤ δ, this implies the security condition for Alice, with a total error of at most 41δ + 2ε.
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Appendix C: Derivation of parameters
In this section, we show how to compute the parameters for both experimental setups.
1. Weak coherent source
The case of phase-randomized weak coherent pulses is particularly easy to analyze, since here we can assume that
Bob always gains full knowledge of the encoded bit from a multi-photon emission. That is, pd,nB,err = 0 for all n > 1.
In particular, this yields
pdB,no click = p
0
src = e
−µ, (C1)
and
p1src = e
−µµ. (C2)
The action of Bob’s detection device can be described by two positive-operator valued measures (POVM), one for each
of the two polarization bases β used in the BB84 protocol. Each POVM contains four elements: F βvac, F
β
0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
D .
The outcome of the first operator, F βvac, corresponds to no click in the detectors, the following two POVM operators,
F β0 and F
β
1 , give precisely one detection click, and the last one, F
β
D , gives rise to both detectors being triggered. If
we denote by |n,m〉β the state which has n photons in one mode and m photons in the orthogonal polarization mode
with respect to the polarization basis β, the elements of the POVM for this basis are given by
F βvac =
∞∑
n,m=0
η¯n+m |n,m〉β〈n,m|, (C3)
F β0 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)η¯m |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F β1 =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯m)η¯n |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
F βD =
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− η¯n)(1 − η¯m) |n,m〉β〈n,m|,
where η is the detection efficiency of a detector as introduced in Section VA1 and η¯ = (1− η). Furthermore, we take
into account that the detectors show noise in the form of dark counts which are, to a good approximation, independent
of the incoming signals. As in Section VA1, the dark count probability of each detector is denoted by pdark.
First of all, since Alice does not verify how many photons have actually been emitted we have
pnsent = p
n
src . (C4)
To determine the other parameters, we start by computing the probability that an honest Bob does not observe a
click due to a signal being sent which can be expressed as
phB,S,no click = Tr(F
β
vacρk) = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
(1− η)n , (C5)
with ρk given by (25). Conversely, the probability that Bob does see a click due to a signal being sent is
phB,S,click = 1− phB,S,no click. (C6)
To calculate the total probability of Bob observing a click in his detection apparatus, we have to take dark counts
into account. We now write the probability of Bob observing no-click due to a dark count as
pB,D,no click = (1− pdark)2, (C7)
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and the probability that at least one of his two detectors clicks becomes
pB,D,click = pdark(2− pdark). (C8)
The total probability that honest Bob observes a click is thus
phB,click = p
h
B,S,clickpB,D,no click + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,click + p
h
B,S,clickpB,D,click = p
h
B,S,click + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,click. (C9)
Note that
phB,no click = 1− phB,click . (C10)
To finish our analysis, it remains to evaluate the error probability for honest Bob, which determines how much
error-correcting information Alice will send him. First of all, an error may occur from the signal itself, for example
due to misalignment in the channel. We have
phB,S,err = edet · phB,S,click . (C11)
The second source of errors are dark counts. If the signal has been lost, the probability of making an error due to a
dark count is given by the probability that Bob experiences a click in the wrong detector, or both his detectors click.
Hence, we have
pB,D,err = pdark(1− pdark) + p2dark/2, (C12)
where the second term stems from letting Bob flip a coin to determine the outcome bit when both of his detectors click.
We can also have a combination of errors from the signal and the dark counts. Considering all different possibilities
we obtain
pB,DS,err = p
h
B,S,click
(
(1− edet)pdark
2
+ edetpdark
(
3
2
− pdark
))
. (C13)
Putting everything together we have
phB,err = p
h
B,S,errpB,D,no click + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,err + pB,DS,err. (C14)
2. Parametric down conversion source
In this section, we show how to compute all relevant parameters for a PDC source. Recall that at each time slot,
the source itself emits an entangled state given by (38). The state |Φn〉AB which appears in (40) can be written as
|Φn〉AB =
n∑
m=0
(−1)m√
n+ 1
(a†1)
n−m√
(n−m)!
(a†2)
m
√
m!
|0, 0〉A|m,n−m〉B . (C15)
BS
a
b
c
d
η
FIG. 35: a and b denote the input modes to a beam splitter (BS) of transmittance η, while c and d are the output modes.
We shall consider that both detectors on Alice’s side are equal. In this situation, it is possible to attribute their
losses to a single-loss beam splitter of transmittance η as illustrated in Figure 35. The creation operators a†1 and a
†
2
can be expressed as
a†1 =
√
ηc†1 +
√
1− ηd†1,
a†2 =
√
ηc†2 +
√
1− ηd†2,
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for the two orthogonal polarization modes. Tracing out the modes d1 and d2 we obtain that the state shared by Alice
and Bob, after accounting for Alice’s losses, is given by
ρAB =
∑
n,n′
√
pnsrcp
n′
src
n∑
m=0
n′∑
m′=0
min(n−m,n′−m′)∑
j=0
min(m,m′)∑
ℓ=0
√
(n−m)!m!
(n−m− j)!j!(m− ℓ)!ℓ!√
(n′ −m′)!m′!
(n′ −m′ − j)!j!(m′ − ℓ)!ℓ!
(−1)m+m′√
n+ 1
√
n′ + 1
√
η
n+n′−2j−2ℓ
√
1− η2(j+ℓ)
|n−m− j,m− ℓ〉〈n′ −m′ − j,m′ − ℓ|A ⊗ |m,n−m〉〈m′, n′ −m′|B.
Even though we again have two bases of course, we will only consider one of the two, the other one merely differs
in a prior transform by Alice and does not change the resulting probabilities. For perfect threshold detectors, the
probability that Alice sees a click in her first detector (concluding an encoding of ’0’) is given by
p0A,S,click = Tr((C
A
1 ⊗ IB)ρAB) =
∞∑
n=1
pnsrc
n+ 1
,
n−1∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n] (C16)
where
CA1 =
∞∑
n=1
|n〉〈n|c1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|c2 . (C17)
The probability that she observes a click in the second detector is similarly determined by p1A,S,click = Tr((C
A
2 ⊗IB)ρAB)
with
CA2 = |0〉〈0|c1 ⊗
∞∑
n=1
|n〉〈n|c2 . (C18)
If Alice sees no click in a given round, or both her detectors click, she simply discards this round all together and it
no longer contributes to the protocol. We have that p0A,S,click = p
1
A,S,click.
As discussed previously, we consider that the noise in the form of dark counts shown by the detectors is, to a good
approximation, independent of the incoming signals. Then, to include this effect, we have to consider the probability
of observing a click due to a dark count alone. This is given by the probability that we detect no photons
pvac = Tr((|0, 0〉〈0, 0|c1,c2 ⊗ IB)ρAB), (C19)
but the detector clicks because of a dark count. We can obtain the probability that Alice observes only one click due
to a signal or a dark count, by considering operators of the form
CˆA1 = (1− pdark)CA1 + (1− pdark)pdark|0, 0〉〈0, 0|c1,c2,
CˆA2 = (1− pdark)CA2 + (1− pdark)pdark|0, 0〉〈0, 0|c1,c2,
which gives us
p0A,click = p
1
A,click = (1 − pdark)p0A,S,click + (1− pdark)pdark
∞∑
n=0
pnsrc(1− η)n. (C20)
Combining everything, and tracing out Alice’s register we obtain that Bob’s unnormalized states are given by
ρ˜0B = (1− pdark)ρ˜0,sigB + (1− pdark)pdarkρ˜vacB ,
ρ˜1B = (1− pdark)ρ˜1,sigB + (1− pdark)pdarkρ˜vacB ,
with
ρ˜0,sigB =
∞∑
n=1
pnsrc
n+ 1
n−1∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n] |m,n−m〉〈m,n−m|B,
ρ˜1,sigB =
∞∑
n=1
pnsrc
n+ 1
n−1∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n] |n−m,m〉〈n−m,m|B,
ρ˜vacB =
∞∑
n=0
pnsrc(1− η)n
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
|m,n−m〉〈m,n−m|B,
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In the following, we use ρ = ρ˜/Tr(ρ˜) to refer to the normalized versions of these states. Note that these normalization
factors are the same for an encoding of a ’0’ or a ’1’ and are given by c = p0A,click.
We can now write the probability that the source emits n photons given that Alice obtained one single click in her
measurement apparatus as
pnsent :=
1
c
pnsrc(1− pdark)
(
pdark(1− η)n + 1
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
((1− η)m − (1 − η)n)
)
. (C21)
We are now ready to compute the probabilities relevant to the security analysis. First of all, we need to know the
probability that honest Bob observes a click for the pulses where Alice has obtained one single click,
phB,click = p
h
B,S,clickpB,D,no click + p
h
B,S,no clickpB,D,click + p
h
B,S,clickpB,D,click. (C22)
The probability that honest Bob does not observe a click at all, due to the signal is given by
phB,S,no click = Tr(F
β
vacρ
0
B)
=
1
c
[
pdark(1− pdark)
∞∑
n=0
pnsrc(1− η)2n + (1− pdark)
∞∑
n=0
pnsrc
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n] (1− η)n
]
,
and
phB,S,click = 1− phB,S,no click, (C23)
where the probabilities pB,D,no click and pB,D,click are defined in the same way as in the previous section. We also need
to determine the probability of an error for honest Bob. This is calculated analogous to the case of a weak coherent
source, where we consider the probabilities of an error due to the signal itself, dark counts, and both combined. In our
setting an honest Bob has two detectors to decide what bit Alice has encoded. If both detectors click, we shall consider
again that honest Bob flips a coin to determine the outcome. It is enough to analyze the case of a ’0’ encoding; the
’1’ encoding provides the same result. The probability that Bob makes an error due to the signal is given by
phB,S,err =
1
c
Tr(F ρ˜0B), (C24)
where
F = F˜ β0 +
1
2
F βD,
F˜ β0 = (1 − edet)F β0 + edetF β1 ,
and F β0 , F
β
1 , and F
β
D are given by (C3). Note that
phB,S,click = p
h
B,S,err + p
h
B,S,no err. (C25)
Then, using that
pB,DS,err = p
h
B,S,errpdark
(3
2
− pdark
)
+ phB,S,no err
pdark
2
, (C26)
we can now compute the combined error of Bob as in Eq. (C14).
In the case of PDC source we also need to compute Bob’s success probability of decoding a bit from a multi-photon
emission, if he is given the basis information for free. First of all, note that since ρ0B and ρ
1
B are Fock diagonal states,
without loss of generality we can always assume that dishonest Bob first measures the photon number of each pulse
sent by Alice, and afterwards he performs his attack. For n ≥ 1, we have
ρ˜0,n,sigB =
pnsrc
n+ 1
n−1∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n]|m,n−m〉〈m,n−m|B,
ρ˜1,n,sigB =
pnsrc
n+ 1
n−1∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n]|n−m,m〉〈n−m,m|B,
ρ˜vac,nB = p
n
src
(1− η)n
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
|m,n−m〉〈m,n−m|B.
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The unnormalized states of Bob containing n photons and corresponding to an encoding of a ’0’ or ’1’ respectively
can then be written as
ρ˜0,nB = (1 − pdark)ρ˜0,n,sigB + (1− pdark)pdarkρ˜vac,nB ,
ρ˜1,nB = (1 − pdark)ρ˜1,n,sigB + (1− pdark)pdarkρ˜vac,nB .
The normalization factor for both states is
cn := Tr(ρ˜
0,n
B ) = (1− pdark)Tr(ρ˜0,n,sigB ) + (1− pdark)pdark Tr(ρ˜vac,nB )
= (1− pdark) p
n
src
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
[(1− η)m − (1− η)n] + (1− pdark)pdarkpnsrc(1− η)n .
Claim C.1. The probability that Bob makes an error in decoding if Alice sent an n-photon signal and he is given the
basis information for free is given by
pd,nB,err =
1
2
− 1
4
(
1− pdark
cn
pnsrc
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
|(1− η)m − (1 − η)n−m|
)
. (C27)
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Helstrom’s theorem [42] using the fact that an encoding of ’0’ and ’1’ are
a priori equally probable for Bob. Furthermore, note that ρ0,nB and ρ
1,n
B are both Fock diagonal, and hence their trace
distance is simply given by the classical statistic distance on the r.h.s. of
1
2
||ρ0,nB − ρ1,nB ||1 =
1− pdark
2cn
pnsrc
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
|(1 − η)m − (1− η)n−m|. (C28)
